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Uninsured Motorist Coverage-A Survey
The much debated and vexatious problem of the uninsured and
financially irresponsible motorist has led liability insurance carriers
in recent years to offer an endorsement or new clause on their auto-
mobile liability insurance policies known as uninsured motorist insur-
ance. Essentially, this coverage affords protection to the insured when
he is injured as a result of the negligence of an uninsured motorist.
Although satisfying a long felt social need to overcome the injustices
produced by financially irresponsible motorists, this coverage is
fraught with procedural and substantive difficulties. It is the purpose
of this note to define and explain the more troublesome terms of a
typical policy of this nature, and to explore the procedural problems
encountered by both the insured and his insurer in implementing the
policy. Although such coverage has evoked a good deal of professional
discussion," its late birth is reflected by a pittance of litigation con-
struing it.
The need to protect the innocent victims of negligent, uninsured
motorists arose within a few years after the automobile came into
general use and was reflected in early state legislation requiring either
compulsory insurance or proof of financial responsibility.3 Since
then, every state except Alaska,4 as well as many foreign countries,r
1. See, e.g., Cheek, Recovery Procedure Under the Uninsured Motorist Cover-
age of the Family Liability Policy, 1960 INs. L.J. 723; Murphy & Netherton,
Public Responsibility and the Uninsured Motorist, 47 GEo. L.J. 700 (1959).
2. Mass. Laws & Resolves 1927, ch. 127, §§ 1, 2. For a history of state
legislation, see Risjord & Austin, The Problem of the Financially Irresponsible
Motorist, 24 U. KAN. CITy L. R.v. 82 (1955).
3. E.g., Conn. Pub. Laws 1925 ch. 183.
4. A complete list of citations, arranged alphabetically by states, is set forth
in Ward, New York's Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation: Past,
Present & Future, 8 BUFFALo L. REV. 215, 218 n.8 (1959). It is to be noted that
the legislative approaches to the problem group themselves primarily into four
categories: 1) financial responsibility laws; 2) unsatisfied judgment funds; 3)
-workmen's compensation plans; and 4) compulsory insurance. Bohlinger, Which
Road for the Uninsured Motorist?, 1951 INs. L.J. 433. For discussions and com-
parisons of the categories, see Bambrick, A Look at the New Jersey Unsatisfied
Claim and Judgment Fund, 1956 INs. L.J. 725; Baillie, The Manitoba Road for
the Uninsured Motorist, 1952 INs. L.J. 109; Green, An Insurer Looks at the New
Jersey Unsatisfied Judgment Fund Law, 1956 INs. L.J. 728; Kuvin, Automobile
Liability Insurance: What Is Its Future Course?, 1956 INs. L.J. 407; Murphy &
Netherton, Public Responsibility and the Uninsured Motorist, 47 GEo. L.J. 700
(1959); Risjord & Austin, The Problem of the Financially Irresponsible Motorist,
24 U. KAN. CiTy L. REV. 82 (1955); Ward, New York's Motor Vehicle Accident
Indemnification Corporation: Past, Present & Future, 8 BUFFALO L. REV. 215
(1959); Ward, The Uninsured Motorist: National and International Protection
Presently Available and Comparative Problems in Substantial Similarity, 9
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has adopted similar statutes. Helpful as such measures may be in
encouraging motorists to purchase liability insurance, they still afford
no protection to the victim of an uninsured motorist who is unable to
post the required statutory bond. There is small comfort in the
knowledge that the negligent motorist may lose his driving privileges
by reason of his failure to comply with the financial responsibility law
when his victim is faced with serious and permanent injuries.
I. ADOPTION OF UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
Uninsured motorist coverage was first proposed by liability insur-
ance carriers both as a result of their concern for the victims of irre-
sponsible motorists and because of their dislike for state-imposed pro-
grams of compulsory insurance and public unsatisfied judgment
funds.8 The forerunner of the uninsured motorist provision was un-
satisfied judgment insurance which was offered for the first time in
1925 by the Utilities Indemnity Exchange, predecessor to the Utilities
Insurance Company7 However, this insurance was of only limited
value in that it was payable only after the insured's claim was re-
duced to judgment and was demonstrably shown to be uncollectible.
The first true uninsured motorist coverage appeared in 1956 when
the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the Mutual Insur-
ance Rating Bureau drafted and promulgated such insurance as an
endorsement to their standard family automobile policy, which per-
mitted recovery for bodily injury not exceeding the dollar limit im-
posed by the state financial responsibility laws." Thus, an insured
victim of an uninsured motorist may be in as good a position as he
BUFFALO L. REv. 283 (1959-60); Insurance As To Uninsured Motorist, Annot.,
79 A.L.R.2d 1252 (1961).
5. For a general discussion of the programs in the Canadian Provinces, Eng-
land, France, Switzerland, Australia, Japan and New Zealand, see Ward, The
Uninsured Motorist: National and International Protection Presently Available
and Comparative Problems in Substantial Similarity, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 283
(1959-60).
6. Massachusetts (MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 90, § 113A-G (1946)) and New York
(N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW §§ 93-93K) require compulsory insurance. North
Dakota (N.D. REv. CODE §§ 39-1701-1710 (Supp. 1957)) and New Jersey (N.J.
REV. STAT. §§ 3A: 6-61-91 (Supp. 1958) ) provide for unsatisfied judgment funds.
Unsatisfied judgment funds usually permit residents of the state, when injured
within the state by a financially irresponsible motorist, to recover a limited
amount of compensation from a state fund. The fund is generally financed by an
assessment on each vehicle registered in the state.
7. George, Insuring Injuries Caused by Uninsured Motorists, 1956 INs. L.J.
715.
8. The National Bureau's coverage was called Family Protection Automobile
Coverage, while the Mutual Bureau's was called Family Protection Against
Uninsured Motorist insurance. See Plummer, Handling Claims Under The Un-
insured Motorist Coverage, 1957 INs. L.J. 494.
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would be in had the other driver carried bodily injury liability insur-
ance equal in amount to that required under the financial responsi-
bility law of the particular state.
The uninsured motorist clause suggested by the National Bureau of
Casualty Underwriters to its members typifies the general endorse-
ment in use today.9 In the insuring agreement the company promises:
To pay all sums which the insured ... shall be legally entitled
to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an unin-
sured automobile because of bodily injury... sustained by the
insured, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of such uninsured automobile; provided...
determination as to whether the insured.., is legally entitled to
recover such damages, and if so the amount thereof, shall be made
by agreement between the insured and the company or, if they
fail to agree, by arbitration10
Although the great majority of claims under this clause are handled
without dispute,1" it is not always clear which persons fit the definition
of uninsured, or what the result will be when the insured files suit
against the uninsured motorist without the permission of his insurer,
as required in most policies, or fails to submit the amount of damages
to arbitration. An attempt will be made to clarify these situations in
the material which follows.
II. PROBLEMS IN DEFINING POLICY TERMS
Persons Uninsured
Since the policy, by its terms, is payable only where the insured is
injured by an uninsured motorist, it remains to be determined just
when one is uninsured within the meaning of the policy. Under the
Bureau policy 12 the term includes automobiles with respect to which
9. The clause is Part IV of the Standard Provisions For Automobile Combina-
tion Policies, Family Automobile Form, First Revision, May 1, 1958; prepared by
the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, 125 Maiden Lane, New York 38,
New York [hereinafter cited as Bureau Policy].
10. Bureau Policy, Coverage J, Uninsured Motorist, Damages for Bodily
Injury.
11. As outlined in the policy, when the insured is injured and learns the ad-
verse party has no insurance, he must notify his company of his intention to use
the uninsured clause. The company investigates and determines for itself whether
the adverse party fits the definition of uninsured in the policy. The insurer would
then try to settle the question of liability, and the amount of damages with the
insured. If, for some reason, they cannot reach a settlement, either party would
have the option to demand arbitration. The arbitration procedure outlined in the
policy follows special rules of the American Arbitration Association, and the
arbitrator's decision is final. Before arbitration the insured may file suit against
the uninsured motorist but may not pursue it to judgment without the permission
Df the company.
12. Bureau Policy.
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there is no bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable
at the time of the accident, 3 or an automobile classified as "hit-and-
run."'" However, not included is an automobile defined within the
policy as an insured automobile," an automobile owned by the named
insured or by any resident of the same household, 6 an automobile
owned or operated by a self-insurer within the meaning of any motor
vehicle financial responsibility law,17 an automobile owned by a gov-
ernmental body's or one operated on rails or crawler treads"° or of the
tractor type.'0
Closely linked with the definition of uninsured is the procedural
problem of how the insured demonstrates to his insurer that he was,
in fact, injured by an uninsured motorist. Does the injured simply ask
the other party, file suit against him, rely upon filings of non-insurance
with the state motor vehicle responsibility unit, or must he employ an
independent investigation? Beyond this, how would the insured, in
an action against his own insurer under the uninsured motorist clause,
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that the responsible
motorist was uninsured? In the only instance where this question has
been raised before an appellate court, no satisfactory result was
reached. In Levy v. American Automobile Ins. Co.,2 1 counsel for plain-
tiff-insured made every conceivable attempt to establish the non-
insurance of the negligent motorist, all of which were rejected by the
court. Plaintiff obtained a judgment against the uninsured motorist
and then brought this action against his own insurer to recover under
the uninsured motorist clause of his policy. In establishing that an
uninsured motorist was involved in the accident, plaintiff's attorney
testified that after he failed to get a response from letters requesting
that the original defendants contact their insurers, he made a personal
investigation and that both individuals told him they were uninsured.
This testimony was introduced, over objection, as declarations against
financial interest without any showing, as required by Illinois law,
that the declarants were unavailable to testify. The Illinois Court of
Appeals held this reversible error and remanded for retrial without
13. Bureau Policy, Coverage J, Uninsured Automobile § (a).
14. Bureau Policy, Coverage J, Uninsured Automobile § (b).
15. Bureau Policy, Coverage J, Uninsured Automobile § (1).
16. Bureau Policy, Coverage J, Uninsured Automobile § (2).
17. Bureau Policy, Coverage J, Uninsured Automobile § (3), (such as buses of
a city public service company or long-haul units of a common carrier); see
Plummer, Handling Claims Under the Uninsured Motorist Coverage, op. cit.
supra note 8, at 495.
18. Bureau Policy, Coverage J, Uninsured Automobile § (4).
19. Bureau Policy, Coverage J, Uninsured Automobile § (5).
20. Bureau Policy, Coverage J, Uninsured Automobile § (6).
21. 31 Ill. App. 2d 157, 175 N.E.2d 607 (1961).
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deciding whether the testimony would have been sufficient to establish
non-insurance had the declarants been shown to be unavailable. Fur-
ther, the insured's argument that there was an assent by silence to the
issue of non-insurance was held equally without merit. Finally, the
fact that no insurer for the wrongdoer contacted the insured also
failed to supply the necessary element of proof of non-insurance.22
Upon retrial of the case, plaintiff introduced certified letters from the
Illinois Secretary of State showing that the operators' licenses of the
alleged uninsured parties had been suspended for failure to comply
with the Financial Responsibility Law.23 The results on retrial are
unknown, but this method of proof would appear to be adequate.24
The overall result of the Levy case would seem to place an unneces-
sarily severe burden of proof on the insured in situations of this kind,
and it is difficult to imagine what degree of proof of non-insurance
would satisfy the court. It would seem far more advisable to require
insurers to indicate in the policy just what proof of non-insurance
would satisfy the policy requirement.
Some degree of clarification has been achieved in defining unin-
sured by various state statutes, probably as a result of dissatisfaction
with an earlier judicial attitude. For example, in the New York case
of In re Berman, 25 the court held that uninsured could not be extended
to include a motorist whose insurance company had denied coverage
by reason of lack of co-operation of its insured. The obvious injustice
of this ruling was changed by a statute26 which broadened the defi-
nition to include cases where liability insurance exists but coverage is
denied. Similar statutes are now in effect in California27 and South
Carolina.2 8
It will be recalled that the Bureau policy provision 29 limits its cover-
age to the dollar limit required under the state financial responsi-
bility laws. If in a given case the state dollar requirement is $10,000
and the insured is injured by a motorist who carries only $5,000 in
liability insurance, can it be said, for purposes of the uninsured mo-
torist clause, that the negligent driver is uninsured to the extent of
$5,000? Legislation in Florida 0 and South Carolina"1 has specifically
22. Ibid.
23. Letter from Fred S. Posner, attorney for Plaintiff, to author, Oct. 2, 1961.
24. Ibid.
25. 11 Misc. 2d 291, 171 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
26. N.Y. INs. LAw § 167(2) (a) (1961).
27. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(b) (Deering, Supp. 1961).
28. S.C. INS. CODE § 46-750.21(3) (b) (Supp. 1960).
29. Bureau Policy, Coverage J, Uninsured Motorist, Damages for Bodily
Injury.
30. FLA. MOTOR VEHICLE STAT. § 324.051(4) (1958).
31. S.C. INS. CODE § 46-750.21(a) (Supp. 1960).
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provided an affirmative answer to the question. However, bearing in
mind the underlying purpose of this type of insurance, it is difficult
to perceive any rational distinction between a partially insured and a
totally uninsured motorist, since in either case insurance does not
exist in an amount equal to that required under the financial responsi-
bility laws.
An allied problem in defining uninsured arises where the insured is
injured by a hit-and-run driver. Although the standard policy in-
cludes the hit-and-run-contingency within its definition of uninsured,3?
it also requires physical contact between the hit-and-run automobile
and the insured or the automobile in which he is riding,33 ostensibly
to prevent fraud. However, assume that a hit-and-run automobile
collided with a third vehicle, forcing it into the insured. Although
there has not been strict compliance with the policy requirements,
should the courts apply the traditional doctrines of "factual causa-
tion" or "proximate cause" so as to bring the insured within the
coverage of the policy? The point has, as yet, not been determined,
but since this "contact" requirement exists to prevent fraud, where a
legitimate claim is made out and the test of factual causation is met,
the policy exclusion should fail.34
Prohibition Against Multiple Recovery
The uninsured motorist clause is limited in scope so that it only
applies when no other insurance is applicable.35 Thus, with respect to
32. The hit-and-run automobile is defined as one which causes bodily injury to
an insured arising out of the physical contact of such automobile with the insured
or with an automobile in which the insured is riding, provided the identity of
either the operator or the owner of the hit-and-run automobile cannot be ascer-
tained. Further, the insured or someone on his behalf must report the accident
within 24 hours to a police officer and within 30 days file a statement under oath
with the insurer that the insured or his legal representative has a cause of action
against a person whose identity is unascertainable. And finally, at the company's
request, the insured or his legal representative must make available for inspection
the automobile in which the insured was riding at the time of the accident.
(Bureau Policy, Coverage J, Definitions, "hit-and-run" automobile.) New York
has provided for the hit-and-run situation under its elaborate insurance code.
N.Y. INS. LAw § 617 (1961). The necessity for strict compliance with the
procedural requirements of the New York statute is illustrated in Bonavisa v.
MVAIC, 21 Misc. 2d 963, 198 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1960), where the injured
party in a hit-and-run-accident waited three days to notify the police, although
the statute required notification within 24 hours. The injured party was refused
recovery.
33. Bureau Policy, Coverage J, Definitions, 'hit-and-run" automobile.
34. Aguilar, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 36 J. S. B. CAL. 205 (1961) poses
the problem.
35. Bureau Policy, Coverage J, Exclusions (c), states that the policy may not,
"inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any workmen's compensation or
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1962/iss1/10
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bodily injury to an insured occupying an automobile not owned by
himself, if he can recover under any other uninsured motorist insur-
ance, such as that carried on his host's automobile, then his own
policy will apply only as excess.3 6 Some policies even go so far as to
provide that in such a situation, the host's insurance is solely applicable
and no coverage whatsoever is provided under the named insured's
uninsured clause.37 Further, if the insured has several uninsured
motorist clauses applicable to himself, as where he owns several auto-
mobiles insured by different companies, any claim made by him can-
not exceed the policy with the highest limits of liability. All such com-
panies contribute only in proportion to the total possible coverages. 38
Broadly speaking, the limits of liability under uninsured motorist pro-
visions are: 1) limited under the financial responsibility law of the
state where the coverage is written; 2) reduced by the amount of any
payment under bodily injury coverage in the same accident; 3) re-
duced by the payment of workmen's compensation claims; 4) prorated
between two policies containing like endorsements in the insured's
name; and 5) reduced by medical payments claimsI (in some policies).3o
The Trust Agreement
If a claim by the insured under his policy is honored by his company,
what recourse has the company in recouping its losses from the negli-
gent, uninsured motorist? Subrogation, the standard recovery device
of insurance companies, is unavailable in this situation since it is well
established that an unliquidated claim for bodily injury is unassign-
disability benefits carrier or any person or organization qualifying as a self-
insurer under any workmen's compensation or disability benefits law or any
similar law." This provision has received judicial sanction in Commissioner v.
Miller, 4 App. Div. 2d 481, 166 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
36. Bureau Policy, Coverage J, Other Insurance. For other provisions and
uses, see Bureau Policy, Coverage J, Limits of Liability § (b). If claim is made
under the uninsured section, and claim is also made against any person insured
under the liability section of the policy because of bodily injury sustained in an
accident by a person who is an insured under the uninsured portion: (1) any
payment made under the uninsured portion for any such person shall be applied
in reduction of any amount which he may be entitled to recover from any
person insured under the liability section; and (2) any payment made under the
liability portion to or for any such person shall be applied in reduction of any
amount which he may be entitled to recover under the uninsured portion.
37. Address by Ross G. Hume, Legal Counsel for State Farm Mutual Auto
Ins. Co., of Bloomington, Illinois, to the Illinois State Bar Meeting in Chicago,
Nov. 1959.
38. Bureau Policy, Coverage J, Other Insurance.
39. For a more detailed discussion of each limitation see Cheek, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 725.
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able.40 However, the uninsured motorist provision produces the same
effect as subrogation through the use of a trust agreement41 which en-
titles the company, to the extent of any payment made by it, to the
proceeds of any settlement or judgment which results from the exer-
cise of any rights of recovery of the insured against any person legally
responsible. The insured is said to hold in trust for the company all
rights of recovery he has against the other party, and must do what-
ever is proper to secure payment from the wrongdoer including filing
suit, if necessary. 42 However, the efficacy of such an arrangement can
be seriously questioned, since the company, once payment is made to
its insured under the policy, is faced with the prospect of working
with a disinterested insured.
III. SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN RECOVERY PROCEDURE
It will be recalled that the standard uninsured motorist clause re-
quires the submission of the dispute to arbitration when the insured
and the company cannot reach agreement. Coupled with this is the
prohibition which forbids the insured to seek judgment against the
uninsured motorist without first obtaining the written consent of the
company. These recovery procedures are, of course, conditions pre-
cedent to the company's liability on the policy and it is not likely that
an insurance company would give its consent to a suit against the
uninsured motorist by its insured if its insured had failed to arbitrate,
since the judgment thereby obtained would, in all probability, be
determinative as against the company both as to its liability under the
40. Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Ill. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928); Coughin v. New York
Cent. R.R., 71 N.Y. 443 (1877); Morgenbesser, Some Legal Aspects of the New
York, Uninsured Motorists Coverage, 28 N.Y.B. BULL. 132 (1956).
41. Bureau Policy, Coverage J, Trust Agreement.
42. This action will be in the insured's name, and in the event of recovery,
the company will be reimbursed for its expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees. The
insured also has to execute and deliver to the company any paper which may be
appropriate to secure the rights and obligations of the insured and the company,
and the insured can do nothing that might prejudice the insurer's rights. Illinois
has recently held that this form of trust agreement is valid as a subrogation
clause, and is not an assignment of a cause of action, although that case dealt
with dram shop insurance. See Remsen v. Midway Liquors Inc., 30 Ill. App. 2d
132, 174 N.E.2d 7 (1961).
There appear to be opposite views as to the value of the trust agreement to the
insurance company. One view is that the trust agreement is useless. Once the
company releases funds to its insured and obtains a trust agreement, then, from
a practical point of view, the company is faced with the prospect of working with
a disinterested insured. The argument for the agreement is that pressure can be
exerted against a reluctant insured to make him co-operate. Further, under
financial responsibility laws the uninsured motorist may lose his driver's license
and registration plates unless he furnishes the state with a signed release. This
motivates the uninsured motorist to co-operate and make some payments.
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policy and the amount of damages. Presumably, in a state which
sanctions such arbitration agreements, if the insured refused to sub-
mit his claim to arbitration, but instead recovered judgment against
the uninsured motorist without the company's permission, the insurer
could successfully resist payment on the policy on the grounds that
the insured had failed to comply with the recovery procedure set forth
in the policy. This would appear to be the result in at least twenty
jurisdictions43 which have overruled the common law prohibition
against the enforcement of contracts to arbitrate future disputes.
However, a few jurisdictions still adhere to the common law rule
that a contract for the arbitration of future disputes is unenforceable.
For instance, Missouri provides that:
Any contract or agreement hereafter entered into containing any
clause or provision providing for an adjustment by arbitration
shall not preclude any party or beneficiary under such contract
or agreement from instituting suit or other legal action on such
contract at any time, and the compliance with such clause or pro-
vision shall not be a condition precedent to... recover in such
action.
44
Such a rule is also recognized in Illinois, 0 Oklahoma 0 and South
Carolina.47 Thus, if the mandatory arbitration provisions could not
be enforced and the company denied permission to its insured to bring
suit, this would leave the insured without a remedy. The injustice of
such a result was recognized by the South Carolina court in Childs v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 48 where the insurance company insisted that its own
insured was negligent and thus not entitled to benefits under the un-
insured motorist clause. The insured obtained judgment against the
uninsured motorist without the company's permission and then sought
43. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Brunner, 12 Cal. Rptr. 547 (Ct. App.
1961); Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean & Elevator Co., 76 Colo. 409, 232 Pac. 680
(1925); Park Constr. Co. v. Independent School Dist., 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.W.
475 (1941); United Ass'n of Journeymen Union v. Stine, 351 P.2d 965 (Nev.
1960); ARiz. REv. CODE §§ 12.1501-10 (1956); CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 1280 (Deer-
ing 1959); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-408-421 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 57.01-
.09 (1943); HAwAIr REV. LAws ch. 188, § 1 (1955); LA. REV. STAT. tit. 9, § 4201-17
(1950); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 251, § 14 (1956); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.2483
(1943); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 542:2 (1955); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:24-1 to -2
(1951); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3-1 to -8 (1953); OHIO REv. CODE §§ 2711.01-.12
(Baldwin's 1958); ORE. REV, STAT. § 33.220 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 161
(1930); R.I GEN. LAWS. ANN. § 10.3.2 (1956); WASH. Rsv. CODE ANN. §§
7.04.010-.180 (1961); Wisc. STAT. ANN. §§ 298.01-.14 (1958).
44. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.010 (1959).
45. Levy v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 3 Ill. App. 2d 157, 175 N.E.2d 607 (1961).
46. Boughton v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 354 P.2d 1085 (Okla. 1959).
47. Childs v. Allstate Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 455, 117 S.E.2d 867 (1961).
48. Ibid.
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to recover from his insurer, who defended on the ground that it had
not given permission to sue as required by the policy. On appeal by
the company after an adverse trial court judgment, this defense was
summarily dismissed, the court saying:
Having determined independently and for itself without ar-
bitral or other apparent aid, that respondent was at fault and
legally responsible for the collision with the uninsured driver
(whose property damage claim it paid) and having on that ac-
count denied liability to respondent under the uninsured motorist
provision of the policy, appellant is simply not in position to in-
voke this provision of the policy49
It is submitted that this is the only just result where arbitration
clauses are unenforceable. A further conclusion following from this
position is that if liability and damages may not be finally determined
by arbitration, a judgment against the uninsured motorist by the in-
sured must necessarily be binding upon the company on both issues.
This was exactly the result reached in Oklahoma in Boughton v.
Farmers Ins. Exch.50 This necessarily has the effect of subjecting an
insurance company to liability in an action in which it was not a party
and in which it had no opportunity to submit evidence or cross ex-
amine. Such a result, however, would not be altogether unsatisfactory
in a modern code pleading jurisdiction where a broad scope of third-
party practice and intervention is permitted. It is submitted that the
insurance company, in a state which will not enforce mandatory
arbitration agreements, would be well advised to simply give per-
mission to its insured to seek judgment against the uninsured motorist
and then intervene in the action as a third party defendant. It could
thereby actively participate in litigating both liability and damages.
It is curious to note, however, that this would place the insurer in the
unique position of attempting to prove contributory negligence on the
part of its own insured and to minimize his damages. There is serious
question whether confidential statements made by the insured to his
company prior to suit would be admissible by the company to prove
the negligence of its own insured in the latter's suit on the policy. Cer-
tainly the insured could and would assert the defense of privileged
communication.
But what is an insurance company to do in a state which neither
recognize contracts to arbitrate future disputes nor permits third
party intervention? Farmers Insurance Exchange, faced with this
dilemna after the decision in Boughton placed a new clause in its in-
suring agreement which provides, in substance, that any judgment
obtained by its insured against an uninsured motorist is not binding
49. 237 S.C. at 462, 117 S.E.2d at 871.
50. 354 P.2d 1085 (Okla. 1959).
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on the company either as to liability or damages.21 Whether such
a provision will stand the test of judicial scrutiny is yet to be deter-
mined. The clause would probably be ignored in those jurisdictions
which allow third-party intervention since it would tend to foster a
multiplicity of suits.
CONCLUSION
The need for protection against the financially irresponsible motor-
ist has long been apparent. The evil of unsatisfied-judgment insurance
is that the insurer will not know his standing until a final judgment
against the uninsured motorist has proved to be uncollectible. The
insurer therefore has no opportunity to limit what might be an ex-
cessively high judgment and no chance to recover against the wron-
doer. This, of course, tends to raise the premium rates.
On the other hand, there is equal confusion associated with unin-
sured motorist coverage. Such coverage, however, alleviates some of
the evils associated with unsatisfied judgment insurance through the
use of agreement and arbitration devices. Further, intervention by
the insurer, where permitted, has proved to be a valuable tool for the
insurer in protecting its rights but must be used with caution and
discretion in view of the traditional jury prejudices against insurance
companies appearing in their own name. Thus, uninsured motorist
coverage, although no panacea, has certainly helped fill the financial
vacuum left by irresponsible motorists. It is, as yet, too early to tell
whether its use will be further extended.
51. Farmers Insurance Exchange Automobile Policy, Act-134, 33d Ed. Coverage
X, Benefits for Bodily Injury Caused by Uninsured Motorists (3).
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